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[2]

THE AIMS AND GOAL OF JUNGIAN ANALYSIS

Murray Stein

IN a paper entitled "Psychoanalysis and the Cure of Souls" (1928), Jung spoke of the goal of analysis and drew some parallels and contrasts between analysis and pastoral care. He noted that both share the goal of "curing souls." The difference is that, in analysis, this goal is pursued by working with the unconscious. Rather than trying to help persons reconnect to the symbols and meanings of traditional religions, the analyst seeks to help them relate to their own sources of vitality and symbolic meaning in the unconscious. So, while analysts and clergy may share a similar goal, their methods and approaches are quite different.

Whether this goal of curing souls is undertaken by priests and pastors or by analysts, however, one thing is usually true. The individuals who are seeking help must experience many, often seemingly small, changes in their conscious attitudes, in their patterns of behavior, and in what we call their psychological structures and dynamics, if their growth is to continue and be genuinely effective over an extended period of time. It is for the many small changes in attitude and behavior that the analyst works most of the time, using the therapeutic and analytic tools at his disposal.

For many Jungian analysts, the practice of analysis becomes such a concrete and emotionally immediate experience of daily life that it costs them considerable effort to become, or to remain, fully aware of its larger

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aims and its overall goal. Conversation among analysts is often full of shoptalk about methods and analytic experiences, but relatively empty of reflection on the goal of curing souls. In this respect, analysts are no different from members of the other professions; it is just as easy for doctors and teachers to become so immersed in the particular tasks presented to them every day, and in their need to perform them well, that they neglect the question of what ends their efforts are serving. Even priests and pastors are directed, however, by the more or less unconscious purposes of their professions. Occasionally one or another member of the profession will "come up for air," for an overview of the daily round of work, and will try to reflect on his or her practice and its ends. And so we ask: can we spell out in some detail the Jungian analyst's goal of curing souls?

When a person enters the Jungian analyst's consulting room and brings his or her problems to the analyst's professional attention, a relationship begins and a process of treatment is set in motion. The most obvious goal of this process is the alleviation of psychological suffering. Sometimes this is a fairly simple, even though not necessarily brief, matter of guiding an individual through a psychological crisis with skilled support and understanding. After the emergency has passed, the inherent psychological health of the person takes over and does the rest. But the analyst routinely confronts persons for whom this is not the case, for whom "health" in the usual sense of adequate functioning and psychological well-being is either not so easily attainable or not the real issue. Deeper psychological questions and problems are involved. It is these people who call for the greatest and most sustained efforts the individual analyst can make. Of course they must be similarly motivated to make the greater efforts demanded by analysis, and must be developmentally adequate to the task (cf. chapter by Sandner and Beebe, below; see also chapter by McCurdy, below). In the long-term treatment that ensues, the question of aims and goal does arise in many subtle forms, often voiced as a challenge by analysands.

Before proceeding to my definition of the goal of analysis, a few words about terminology in this chapter are in order. When speaking of *aims*, I am referring to the small, specific changes in attitude, behavior, and perception that an analyst works and hopes for in analysis. By the *goal* of analysis, I mean the overarching, general end point toward which the analytic work as a whole is oriented. In the day-to-day practice of Jungian analysis, the sense of specific, limited aims tends to occupy the foreground of consciousness for both analyst and analysand. This situation is actually necessary and desirable. Many small battles are fought and either won or lost as analysis goes on, and they will add up to significant changes in a

person's psychological patterns if more are won than are lost or severely compromised. When the eye is kept fixed on a long-range goal, the result is usually failure to meet the specific demands for insight and change as they present themselves in analysis and in life. These many small aims, which are intimately related to a person's existence in and out of analysis, can be grouped under a few large-scale aims. These, in turn, can be seen in a still longer perspective: the goal.

A survey of the Jungian literature would quickly reveal a wide range of opinion on the aims of analysis. In the following definition, which is highly abstract, I have attempted to state a goal that could be agreed upon by most Jungian authors and analysts, even if they would, individually, generate many different aims in formulating the more concrete applications and amplifications of this statement. With this definition I am starting with the most abstract and general statement of a goal:

Jungian analysis takes place within a dialectical relationship between two persons, analyst and analysand, and has for its goal the analysand's coming to terms with the unconscious: the analysand is meant to gain insight into the specific unconscious structures and dynamics that emerge during analysis, and the structures underlying ego-consciousness are meant to change in their dynamic relation to other, more unconscious structures and dynamics.

This formula will serve as a guideline for pressing on in our reflections on the aims and goal of Jungian analysis.

Jungian analysis takes place within a dialectical relationship between two persons, analyst and analysand . . .

The Jungian use of the term *analysis* is a legacy of Jung's history. Jung spent the formative years of his psychiatric career as a member of the nascent psychoanalytic movement; he continued to use the term *analysis* to describe his practice even after he had broken with Freud in 1913 and had founded his own distinctive approach to psychotherapy. His attachment to the term is further reflected in the name he preferred for his own body of thought, *analytical psychology*.

The Jungian approach to treatment can justifiably be called analysis because it does, like psychoanalysis, place primary emphasis on revealing the fundamental and often unconscious "building blocks" of the personality. In Jungian analysis, an effort is made to perceive the psyche's composition and its ways of functioning by uncovering the relationship between consciousness, and the experiences that disturb it, and unconscious contents and dynamics. (The *unconscious contents* are called complexes)

and archetypes, depending on their topological depth in the psyche. The term *dynamics* refers to the relations of unconscious contents to each other and to ego-consciousness, as well as to the prospective meaning of these relations for psychological development.) If chemical analysis reveals the chemical composition of a physical substance, psychological analysis discloses the basic patterns, processes, and contents of a human psyche.

Analysis is also descriptively appropriate as a term for Jungian treatment. Within a properly secured and maintained analytic framework (cf. chapter by McCurdy, below), analysands can afford to experience a degree of psychological dissolution. (The word *analysis* is derived from the Greek *analyein*, "to dissolve.") As the fixed attitudes, identifications, and psychological dynamics underlying ego-consciousness and supporting its sense of identity are raised into conscious awareness, and as the unconscious contents that were repressed or left out of a self-image begin to enter the field of consciousness, analysands often feel themselves released into a state of psychological fluidity. This experience of "being in analysis" is necessary if structural change is to come about, because only when the organization of ego-consciousness becomes loosened can the blocked and repressed contents, along with the unconscious strivings for new development, enter the field of consciousness and become available for integration. But the danger of analysis lies here as well, and Jung was acutely aware that analysis could release a latent psychosis (1928a; cf. also chapter by Sandner and Beebe, below). For this reason, careful training for analysts is critically important. Ideally, however, the experience of psychological dissolution in analysis leads to a new synthesis of ego-consciousness (Jung 1966a, p. 80ff.), one that will be more affectively related to the Self, the central organizing agency of the personality, and more structurally reflective of the personality's whole reality than was the earlier formation.

A significant aspect of Jungian treatment, however, is not described so well by the term *analysis*. This is the experience of the Self that often occurs in, or as a result of, Jungian therapy. Jungian analysis results not only in Self-knowledge but also in a new kind of Self-experience. People who enter Jungian analysis may do so because they wish to know more about themselves, but if the analysis actually works, they come to experience themselves in a way that was previously not possible. This new kind of Self-experience takes place as the rigidities of ego-consciousness dissolve, and as the unconscious responds and is acknowledged within the security and understanding of the analytical framework. What actually creates the therapeutic effect in Jungian analysis is the increasing amplitude of a person's experience of the Self. This experience, moreover, usually

brings with it an influx of energy and vitality, so that one common result of analysis is more creativity in one's responses to life and its challenges. Further, synchronistic events—that is, meaningful coincidences—are often noticed to surround experiences of the Self. What these events contribute to the analysis, when attention and value are given to such phenomena, is a sense of meaning, future direction, and destiny. For this aspect of the experience of Jungian treatment, the term *analysis* seems inadequate. Perhaps *therapy*, with its connotation of healing, is more suitable (cf. Meier 1967).

In the Jungian understanding, analysis, as a method both for furthering Self-knowledge and for increasing Self-experience, takes place within the context of a dialectical relationship between analyst and analysand. This relationship is dialectical in the obvious sense of being a two-way interaction, not one-way only: the action of Jungian analysis is understood to be reciprocal (Jung 1966b, p. 8). Normally the effects of this relationship are greater on the analysand than on the analyst, but it is true that the analyst's personality can also be deeply affected by a long-term and psychologically engaging analytical relationship. Jung recognized that analysts can become "infected" by analysands' illnesses and may even occasionally get "assimilated" by their personalities (ibid., p. 72). The strength of the analyst's personality and conscious standpoint are critical for holding up the analyst's end of the dialectic.

The dialectical relationship between analyst and analysand is not the same in every case or at every stage of the analytical process. (Many of the complexities of this dialectical relationship are discussed in the chapters below on transference/countertransference, by Ulanov, and on countertransference/transference, by Machtiger, as well as in the chapter on psychological typology, by Quenk and Quenk.) Jung describes four "stages of treatment" (1966b, pp. 53–75): confession, elucidation or interpretation, education, and transformation. These stages are not necessarily sequential. They characterize several types of relationship analysts and analysands have at various points in analysis, occurring in almost any order or duration. The nature of the dialectical relationship between analyst and analysand is subtly different in each of these stages.

In the first three of the stages as I have listed them, the dialectic comes into play as the knowledge and conscious standpoint of the analyst meets the analysand's conscious attitude and standpoint in a compensatory fashion. This dialectic of compensation can range from empathic mirroring in the first stage, to direct opposition in the second stage, to "filling in missing pieces," by pointing out the options and perspectives that have remained unconscious for the analysand, in the third stage. The aim of this

compensatory dialectic between analyst and analysand is to remove distortions, balance attitudes, and improve psychological functions, for the purpose of facilitating the ego's more complete view of and better approach to the Self and reality.

On the other side of the dialectic, the analyst's own one-sided attitudes are often confronted in a compensatory fashion by the analysands' attitudes. It has often been observed that analysts get the analysands they need for their own further psychological development! Frequently the problems and unconscious material brought into analysis by analysands have an uncanny relationship to the psychological issues an individual analyst needs to face and work through in his or her own individuation process. It is generally recommended that analysts do this by arranging for further analysis themselves, or by using the knowledge and methods they have acquired through analysis earlier.

In some, but by no means all, analytical processes the depth of engagement between the personalities of analyst and analysand penetrates to a level considerably deeper than that of ego-consciousness. The dialectic between them, therefore, extends past their conscious intentions and draws on responses and counterresponses from the deeper, unconscious layers of their personalities. Both personalities become profoundly engaged in the process that is taking place, and the dialectic is then between two persons reacting with, against, and for each other on many levels. The atmosphere is thick with unconscious material, and there is engendered a potential for profound union, and for insight and differentiation, as well as for wounding betrayal. If managed with skill and blessed by good fortune (*Deo concedente*), the dialectic at this level can enter what Jung calls the fourth stage of treatment, transformation. For the dialectical relationship to work therapeutically at this depth, the personality of the analyst is far more critical than any technical know-how he or she may have, although solid training and experience help the analyst avoid many pitfalls (cf. chapters by Singer and Kirsch, below).

|| . . . and has for its goal the analysand's coming to terms with the unconscious . . . ||

The question of the aims and goal of Jungian analysis is a complex one, and it can lead to considerable confusion and misunderstanding. In the literature there is a tangle of opinions. The discussion of what can be counted as "success" and "failure" in analysis, for instance, exemplifies this complexity and often leaves the student in about the same place as when he or she began reading (cf. Guggenbühl-Craig 1972; Adler 1974).

This disarray of opinion is a reflection of the complexity of every an-

alyst's practice. There is no such thing as a typical Jungian analysis, and analysts find themselves involved in such a large variety of issues and specific aims that the idea of a single goal for their work does not seem appropriate. Jung and some Jungian authors have, however, tried to formulate some generalizations about analysis, and the question of general aims and a goal can be approached from this angle.

Much of the apparent confusion in the literature may result in part from the absence in Jungian clinical thought of an agreed upon and precise distinction between short-term, issue-oriented psychotherapy and long-term, transformational analysis. Differentiations among the various "stages of analysis" outlined by Jung may also seem vague. Each of these stages could be seen as having a different set of aims while still sharing in the same general goal. An important step toward making such clarifications has been taken by Goodheart.

Guggenbühl-Craig's rough-and-ready distinction between the goal of psychotherapy, "well-being," and the goal of analysis, "individuation," is another attempt at clarification of goals (1977, pp. 23-24). Psychotherapy is understood by him to be short-term psychological treatment oriented toward resolving specific conscious issues, crises, or problems, and thus toward achieving relaxation of tensions and conflicts. These resolutions bring about a sense of well-being. Analysis, a long-term psychological treatment engaged intensively with material from the unconscious, has a different goal than therapy and therefore has different strategies as well. The pursuit of individuation through analysis, Guggenbühl-Craig points out, requires that the ego go further into intrapsychic tensions, that it endure the inner conflicts that result from the play of opposites in the Self, and that it submit to the processes of healing and resolution of conflict that originate in the Self. As the ego comes to terms with the unconscious, the result is not necessarily a pleasurable sense of well-being, but rather a more conscious sense of the Self. In this view, the goal of psychotherapy is ego-oriented, while the goal of analysis is Self-oriented.

A more important reason, therefore, for the lack of consensus in the field on specific aims for analysis is that its outcome is not governed by the ego-intentions or the conscious knowledge of the analyst. Persons in analysis are meant to stay receptive to the unconscious—to the less rational, more ambiguous, and often mysterious side of the personality—rather than being directed by specific ego-intentions. For this reason, Jung avoided stating a precise set of aims for analysis:

As far as possible I let pure experience decide the therapeutic aims. This may perhaps seem strange, because it is commonly supposed that the therapist has an aim. But in psychotherapy it seems to me positively advisable for the doctor

not to have too fixed an aim. He can hardly know better than the nature and will to live of the patient. The great decisions in human life usually have far more to do with the instincts and other mysterious unconscious factors than with conscious will and well-meaning reasonableness. The shoe that fits one person pinches another; there is no universal recipe for living. Each of us carries his own life-form within him—an irrational form which no other can outbid. (1966b, p. 41)

This statement typifies Jung's viewpoint and shows his high regard for individual solutions to psychological conflicts, as well as his lesser trust in the wisdom of professional ego-intentions.

Jung instructs us to be careful about setting up specific therapeutic aims for analysis, partly because they are so often based on a culturally biased opinion of what is psychologically normative. His views, however, do not proscribe consideration of such aims at every level of generality. The book is not closed. In a discussion of the aims and the goal of Jungian analysis, it is important to be aware of several factors: the level of generality or abstraction one is moving at; the stage of the analytical process one is discussing; and the kind of case and form of psychopathology one is dealing with (cf. Goodheart; see also chapter by Sandner and Beebe, below). Our statement of a goal—"coming to terms with the unconscious"—is a high-level abstraction, and it can be maintained while still holding to the view that analysis does not, and should not, have "too fixed an aim."

Since analysis stays open to the autonomous workings of the unconscious and to the unique personalities of both partners in the dialectical relationship, no one brings to it a preprogrammed agenda of specific aims. Yet it is possible for either partner to put forward a concrete aim in the course of the work. Such aims might involve, for example, the need to work on specific symptoms, issues, or problems; to alter the psychological depth of the discussion from the concrete to the symbolic, and vice versa; and to shift the focus to, or away from, the transference or countertransference. Termination, too, whether full stop or pro tem (cf. chapter by Wheelwright, below), comes up as an aim of analysis at a certain point, and this aim may originate with either the analyst or the analysand. Naturally the discussion of whether or not to pursue a specific aim, of why it is being stated as an aim, and of its possible psychological meaning, is itself an important aspect of analysis.

Jungian analysts have personally experienced, in their own analyses, the challenge of coming to terms with the unconscious (cf. chapter by Kirsch, below). They are familiar with the rigors and strains of this psy-

chological labor. This experience, along with their other clinical and theoretical training, is meant to prepare them to assist analysands in their efforts to do the same. "Together the patient and I address ourselves to the 2,000,000-year-old man that is in all of us," Jung relates. "In the last analysis, most of our difficulties come from losing contact with our instincts, with the age-old unforgotten wisdom stored up in us" (McGuire and Hull, p. 89). But analysts need, and usually have, a developed sensitivity for when they and their analysands are addressing the unconscious at this level and when they need to face up to the influences of personal unconscious complexes and defenses. To consult the latter in the same way would mean detouring away from the goal of coming to terms with the unconscious and would simply dignify old neurotic patterns with false meaning. Those patterns are stumbling blocks in the way of individuation, and it is the task of analysts—and one of their aims—to help analysands confront and overcome them. This can be done by interpreting the neurotic patterns and trying to correct for their distortions and disturbances of consciousness.

Understanding the aims and the goal of Jungian analysis requires seeing them in the light of its theory. The practice of Jungian analysis is intimately linked to, if not justified by, its theory. It does not necessarily follow, as is sometimes suggested, that what comes about in analysis is produced, or even significantly controlled, by the analyst's ideas about what should happen. But an analyst's understanding of what he or she sees and experiences in an analytical relationship is unmistakably marked by the viewpoint that provides the framework for interpretation. The terms *Self* and *collective unconscious*, for example, are attached to theoretical constructs whose living psychological expression is the "2,000,000-year-old man" spoken of by Jung; these theoretical terms and constructs supply the tools for exploring the meaning of such an image and its appearance in analysis. A psychologically sound interpretation of the meaning of images from the unconscious is seen by Jungian analysts as critical for therapy and for the "cure of souls" (cf. Stein 1978).

It is important to recognize that when Jungians speak of "the unconscious," they mean not only a lack of awareness, "unconsciousness," but an area of the mind that is unconscious by nature. It is true that certain contents, such as thoughts, feelings, fantasies, and images, do pass over from the unconscious into ego-consciousness. Nevertheless, the unconscious per se continues to exist as a dynamic factor and source of new contents no matter how conscious an individual may become of such contents. Coming to terms with the unconscious, the goal of anal-

ysis, means establishing a more vital and aware relationship between two enduring components of the mind, the unconscious and ego-consciousness.

... the analysand is meant to gain insight into the specific unconscious structures and dynamics that emerge during analysis ...

The methods used by analysts to make headway toward the goal of analysis are also related to theory. Dream analysis, active imagination, interpretation of behavior patterns in relation to complexes and archetypes, amplification, and so on, are used to help the analysand contact and come to terms with the unconscious. Analysis keeps pointing a person toward the unconscious and, ultimately, it is hoped, toward a glimpse and an experience of the Self. Analysts listen and watch for the appearance of the unconscious and for areas where unconsciousness exists, and they direct attention to those areas because they believe that the causes and meaning of symptoms, as well as the seeds of future psychological development, lie there.

Coming to terms with the unconscious, the goal of Jungian analysis, means that an individual gains insight into the dynamic relations between the ego and the contents of the unconscious (the complexes and archetypes), and that he or she acquires some conscious control and mastery over the psychological interference caused by the personal complexes and defenses.

This psychological mastery and control is achieved by means of insight (cf. von Franz 1978, pp. 165–69). In the context of Jungian analysis, the term *insight* means cognitive understanding that is connected to the emotional background of the content or dynamic being understood. When this understanding is lost in favor of a more purely cognitive meaning, the term can take on an excessively rational coloration and leave the impression of an emotionally detached “analytical attitude.” Insight does imply, quite rightly, a degree of psychological “distance” between ego-consciousness and the unconscious. An aim of analysis, therefore, is to establish and maintain an appropriate degree of this analytical distance, but without losing the connection to the emotional background of the content or dynamic being understood. Insight is in fact not complete until this connection is fully conscious and integrated.

A somewhat artificial distinction, though one that is classically Jungian, is drawn between two phases of analysis. First, there is a period of gaining insight into the material belonging to the personal unconscious (personal complexes and issues of emotional development). Second, there

is a phase of encounter with archetypal material arising from the deeper layers of the unconscious. An extension of this idea holds that the success of analysis as a whole depends upon the first of these phases being largely accomplished before the second is entered. Gaining insight into the infantile tendencies of the personality, and thereby freeing oneself from them, is a precondition for meaningful engagement with the archetypal layers of the psyche (cf. Adler 1967, p. 342).

Jung makes this point in *Psychology and Alchemy*, in a passage in which he also explains how and why psychotherapeutic insight can actually free a person from infantile residues:

It is of course impossible to free oneself from one's childhood without devoting a great deal of work to it. . . . Nor can it be achieved through intellectual knowledge only; what is alone effective is *a remembering that is also a re-experiencing*. The swift passage of years and the overwhelming inrush of the newly discovered world leave a mass of material behind that is never dealt with. We do not shake this off; we merely remove ourselves from it. So that when, in later years, we return to the memories of childhood we find bits of our personality still alive, which cling round us and suffuse us with the feeling of earlier times. Being still in the childhood state, these fragments are very powerful in their effect. They can lose their infantile aspect and be corrected only when they are reunited with adult consciousness. This “personal unconscious” must always be dealt with first, that is, made conscious, otherwise the gateway to the collective unconscious cannot be opened. The journey with father and mother up and down many ladders represents the making conscious of infantile contents that have not yet been integrated. (1944, p. 62; italics added)

Like the phenomenon that William James called “knowledge-about” something, as distinct from “knowledge by acquaintance” (pp. 221–223), insight is, by nature, detailed, intimate, affective awareness. Insight has two features that give it psychologically transformative power: it is a “remembering that is also a re-experiencing,” and it is a connecting of such memories with current adult consciousness. When the complexes that disturb consciousness can be affectively linked up with conscious memories of the events and patterns from childhood that played an important role in emotional development, the complexes lose much of their ability to disrupt and distort consciousness. The affect generated by the complex can be contained by the detailed memory image.

Jungian analysts, unlike their Freudian colleagues, do not generally engage in a meticulous reconstruction of childhood. Nevertheless, as the statement quoted above indicates, a certain amount of re-membering childhood and adolescence does commonly occur in Jungian analysis. It is typical for considerable time to be spent tracing the history of various personal

complexes from infancy to the present and becoming aware of how they have affected ego-consciousness in the past and continue to do so in the present (cf. Dieckmann 1971).

Lambert notes that the purpose of reconstruction is the recognition of oneself "in a continuing context in which [one's] present modes of experiencing and of dealing with [one]self and others are a logical outgrowth" of one's past (p. 24). Linking up current experience and patterns of consciousness with re-experienced moments from childhood in this fashion is referred to by Jungians as the reductive aspect of analysis. Typically, Jungian analysts will take this reductive approach to treatment when it is indicated by compensatory dreams or by what they evaluate as a pathological, unadapted, or inflated ego attitude. The effect of this kind of analysis on an analysand is to free him or her from "excessive anxiety and crippling defensiveness" and to allow him or her "to experience new feelings and potentialities" (Lambert, p. 29).

Jungians understand the "release" of such "new feelings and potentialities" as due to the activation of archetypal layers and contents of the personality. To gain insight into these contents and their psychological meaning, the analyst will employ the symbolic approach, using an "archetypal model" (Whitmont 1971). The purpose of this interpretive approach is to raise the finalistic, or forward-looking, meaning of these contents to consciousness. Here the term *insight* has another nuance of meaning: it signifies the affectively connected understanding of the relation between a psychological pattern or image and its archetypal dimension. This dimension gives it greater meaning and indicates its significance for future psychological development (ibid.).

"Coming to terms with the unconscious," then, means gaining insight in both of these areas: mastering the personal complexes to some extent on the one hand, while grasping the symbolic meaning of emerging archetypal contents on the other. Analysis creates an ongoing dialogue between the ego and the unconscious (Jung 1966a, p. 80), which produces a dialectical tension of opposites within ego-consciousness, between ego strivings on the one hand and unconscious disturbances and archetypally based demands on the other. This dialogue is mirrored in the dialectical structure of analysis itself. This dialectic, in turn, reflects the Self, which actually consists of a dialectical play of the opposites. For ego-consciousness to come to mirror the Self more completely is another way of expressing the goal of analysis.

In addition to insight, the other major component in my statement of the goal of Jungian analysis is psychological change. Coming to terms with

the unconscious involves changing the relationship between ego and unconscious. Hence the last part of our formula:

|| . . . and the structures underlying ego-consciousness are meant to
|| change in their dynamic relation to other, more unconscious struc-
|| tures and dynamics. ||

Here we are speaking of "deep change," rather than the host of small adjustments of ego-attitude that take place in analysis.

This kind of change may seem more orderly and clear when discussed in the abstract than when actually experienced in analysis, and yet it can be regularly observed in long-term analytical practice. It appears as a subtle change in dream motifs and themes, as well as in an analysand's conscious attitudes towards him- or herself and in his or her relations with others. To facilitate this change and to make it a conscious process, analysis is aimed at building a bridge over the gulf between consciousness and the unconscious, a split caused by repression, psychological defensiveness, or inadequate conscious structures. Closing the gap between these two parts of the psyche, itself an aim of analysis, makes it possible for the unconscious to compensate consciousness more effectively. New energies and contents are released from the unconscious, and individuation is allowed to move forward. "My aim," Jung writes, "is to bring about a psychic state in which my patient begins to experiment with his own nature—a state of fluidity, change, and growth where nothing is eternally fixed and hopelessly petrified" (1966b, p. 46). When such a state of fluidity has been brought about, traffic is free to pass from the unconscious into ego-consciousness. It thus becomes easier for contents from the unconscious to challenge the structures underlying ego-consciousness. This dialectical encounter energizes the individuation process and helps activate the mystery of the soul's alchemy and achieve its transformation (cf. Hillman, p. 28).

To clarify the terms I am using in this discussion of the kind of change sought in Jungian analysis, the following very brief definitions are offered. The ego, itself a complex, is the conscious agent and actor of the personality, as well as the center of reflective awareness. The ego ("I") exists in a field of associated psychological contents, such as memories and familiar thoughts, feelings, and fantasies (earlier "I's"); together they make up ego-consciousness. This ego-consciousness is a structured psychological entity—a "character structure" made up of habitual tendencies of thought, impulse management, and so on. Its underlying principle of organization is called a "dominant" (Jung 1955–56, p. 358ff.). Ego-consciousness, in

turn, is in the orbit of the central organizing agency of the personality, the Self. The dominant pattern of organization shown by ego-consciousness is made up of both innate, instinctual/archetypal trends, which are parts of the Self, and social/cultural influences and introjects; this pattern is the result of the foregoing developmental history (see Neumann for a complete developmental theory). The core of the dominant pattern underlying ego-consciousness is made up of a selected number of the many potentialities for psychological development within the Self, and therefore it exhibits the property of "one-sidedness" relative to the psyche as a whole (Jung 1969, p. 292).

The dominant pattern of organization underlying ego-consciousness shapes the ego's identity, channels its available energies, and structures its behaviors. Along these same lines, Hall speaks of a "dominant ego image" made up of "a persistent association of complexes" (p. 173). This association of complexes is, in my view, held together by archetypal patternings and can often be related to specific archetypal images, as has been shown, for example, by the work of Dieckmann (1971).

Because there seems to be an innate striving within the personality to overcome partial Self-expression and the condition of conscious one-sidedness, analysis supports this trend. In analysis, ego-consciousness and its underlying structures are brought into an intensely conscious relation to other, unconscious and unintegrated aspects of the personality. This process may take several forms: the realization of "shadow" aspects of the ego, both negative and positive (Jung 1928b); the encounter with the ego's unconscious contrasexual opposite, the anima (for men) and the animus (for women) (cf. E. Jung); or the recognition of the ego's less developed and inferior functions and their distortions (von Franz 1971). These aspects of the unconscious may be brought into analysis as dream contents, or they may enter as experiences of projection in the transference and countertransference, or in other current life situations. One purpose of bringing them into a conscious relationship with the ego complex is to dislodge the ego's identification with its dominant underlying pattern. A change in ego-consciousness is brought about as the ego ceases to identify with old structures, and as new aspects of the personality are assimilated. A new dominant pattern of organization for ego-consciousness is formed. As a result, the ego's identity is shaped by a more multifarious set of structures, and it therefore more approximately represents the whole Self (cf. Stein 1980, pp. 82-86).

In the analytic process, the ego's attachment to an earlier, underlying dominant pattern of organization is dissolved as it is brought into an intensely conscious relationship with other, more unconscious parts of the

Self. This experience is emotionally painful and the ego usually resists it. A person's ego prefers to maintain its familiar psychological identifications and arrangements of inner objects, even after these have been recognized as outmoded, one-sided, and Self-defeating patterns. This is resistance to individuation, and in analysis, as our statement of the goal implies, one faces such resistance and seeks to diminish its inhibiting effects. The ego resists transformation for a reason: it is threatened with the erasure of a former construction of identity. This process is perceived as the threat of regression to earlier, more helpless, psychological states, and ultimately to extinction of a conscious standpoint.

Some regression is inevitable within the analytic process; optimally it is experienced as a period of safeguarded deconstructing. Later it is seen as having prepared the way for a new and more complete integration of psychic contents in the structures that underlie ego-consciousness and shape conscious identity. "The process that at first sight looks like an alarming regression," Jung writes reassuringly, "is rather a *reculer pour mieux sauter*, an amassing and integration of powers" that will develop into new structures (1966b, pp. 15-16). The change sought in analysis, which is born from psychological regression, is not a revolutionary replacement of one set of dominant contents with another wholly different group. It is, rather, a transformation that combines the earlier psychological formations with new contents from the unconscious. This transformation comes about through "recanalization of libido" (cf. Jung 1969, pp. 41-61), with psychic energy ("libido") now flowing along revised instinctual/archetypal pathways. These new expressions of libido are a combination of some old and some new forms, and the changes in behavior, attitude, and ways of experiencing mirror this reorganization of psychic energy.

The restructuring of libido along new psychic gradients is not purely a product of analysis. Its occurrence is a combination of the intentional work done in analysis and the spontaneous cooperation of the unconscious. The unconscious cooperates by producing symbols that represent the restructuring process and the archetypal groundwork for it. If genuine change in the structures underlying ego-consciousness is actually to come about, the deliberate and conscious action of analysis must be matched by the corresponding participation of the unconscious. Otherwise, the "cure of the soul" that seemingly occurs in analysis will be psychologically superficial, based perhaps only on a personal transference and likely to disappear shortly after termination. Psychological change does not become an effective, long-term change in functioning unless it is the product of structural change that itself has an archetypal basis.

In addition to this change in psychological structures, however, analy-

sis seeks to create a change in the way the major parts of the psyche are related to each other. Together the analyst and analysand try to build channels of permanent openness between ego-consciousness and the unconscious. To accomplish this aspect of the goal, the ego must arrive at a location that is not wholly embedded in the structures of consciousness, a position from which the dynamic relations between consciousness and the unconscious can to some degree be registered and monitored. Jung called this observation point within the psychological universe the "transcendent function." It consists of a type of self-observing ego that is alert but not overly self-conscious or critical; receptive, yet discriminating about emerging psychic contents; knowledgeable about the personal workings of the psyche without being inflated or dogmatic; stable, but flexible. With the ego in this position, the unconscious can percolate through and continue affecting the attitudes and structures of consciousness, despite their tendency to rigidity.

Guggenbühl-Craig has suggested, somewhat ironically, that changes resulting from analysis may come about in great part through the "analytic ritual": visiting an analyst once or twice a week for a number of years; attending regularly to dreams during that period; taking time for serious introspection and inner work; and, thereby, forming new habits of conscious attentiveness to the psyche and its workings (1972). He may overemphasize the impact of the formal aspects of analysis at the expense of the personal content of the analytic experience, but his comments highlight an important point. Although analysis represents only a small portion of an entire individuation process, it can be critically important for making that process a conscious experience. If analysis has succeeded, it will have been a time in a person's life when the complexes and defenses that blocked his or her most intense, profound, and honest relation to life were rendered less effective, and when a rich appreciation of the soul's reality and of its depth and genius was amply nurtured.

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THE STRUCTURE AND DYNAMICS OF ANALYSIS

PART TWO