


## 7. *Integration of the Anima*

ONE OF Jung's many passages may lead us to believe that at some point personifying comes to an end and is even a desired end. The implication is clear: integration into consciousness means converting the person into a function.<sup>a</sup> It also means moving from image to content, from the sensate immediacy of fantasies to the psychology of meanings. For anima presents herself in fantasies, rather than meanings. It is implied that the anima as function is superior to the anima personified. Further support for anima integration as "breaking up the personifications" can be drawn from other



passages where Jung speaks of "the dissolution of the anima"<sup>a</sup> and of "depersonalizing" and "subjugating the anima."<sup>b</sup> See also CW 16, §504 and the long discussion of Hermas with his Rhoda (CW 6, §381 ff.) and the early Christian struggle with sexuality evoked by the anima.<sup>c</sup>

The notion of anima integration in the long passage cited above (CW 7, §339), and elsewhere (CW 7, §374), has a heroic tinge; its formulation is in the language of "conquest," battle, darkness and light. The process is described in the ego language of compensation with a moralistic undertone ("because we are not using them purposefully as functions . . . they remain personified complexes," CW 7, §339). Consequently, we have that antagonism of "masculine ego versus the feminine 'other,' i.e., conscious versus unconscious personified as anima" (CW 16, §434). The entire relationship with anima is placed into the mythologem of the heroic ego and his archetypal fight with the dragon. Then efforts to integrate, "to bring these contents to light," become a depotentiating of personifications and of their imaginal power, a drying-up of the waters, and a slaying of the angel (seen to be a dangerous fairy-demon by the ego), whose real purpose is to individualize itself within a personal relation to an individual. This Corbin has pointed out.<sup>39</sup> The feminine image that the hero meets is his guardian angel, not his enemy, and it is *her* individualization, not his or mine, that matters to the soul. Her individualization into distinct personality is precisely what soul-making is all about. To depersonify anima – if this is truly possible at all – would serve only one psychological purpose: to keep the ego forever in its heroic stance.

Depersonalizing the anima can produce unnecessary damage in human affairs when this idea is taken literally, leading to brutal rejection (presented as noble renunciations) and a subsequent "diminution of vitality, of flexibility, and of human kindness" in a series of psychic horrors Jung goes on to recount in the same paragraph.<sup>d</sup> The entire operation of literal choice between spirit and body, inner and outer, positive and negative has its source in 'ego consciousness' which maintains itself best through giving reality to these fantasies, forcing opposition between them, suppressing one, and then calling this game 'choice.' So the anima always presents heroic consciousness with a moral dilemma. But the moral dilemma is in the nature of the ego and not in the nature of the anima.

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, Letter to Anonymous

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CW 13, §62

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CW 9, ii, §41

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CW 9, i, §61

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CW 13, §62

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CW 9, i, §178

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When we read the major passage with which we began this section in the light of others on the same theme, we discover more precisely what "integration" means. "Though the effects of anima and animus can be made conscious, they themselves are factors transcending consciousness and beyond the reach of perception and volition. Hence they remain autonomous despite the integration of their contents" (CW 9, ii, §40).<sup>a</sup> All we can do is remember their spontaneous reality behind contents, projections, effects<sup>b</sup> and grant "relative autonomy and reality" to these psychic "figures" (CW 9, ii, §44), which Jung often presents as Gods and Goddesses.<sup>c</sup> Anima "integration" is thus "knowledge of this structure," a recognition of her as archetype (CW 14, §616). The operative term is thorough *recognition*.<sup>d</sup> And just what is to be recognized? – the relatively autonomous, personified nature of the archetype. From this it would seem that anima integration means just the reverse of turning personification into function and that, by continuing to recognize her as a relatively independent person, we are indeed performing the work of integration.

The question as answered by alchemy is no longer simply a disjunction: either figure or function, person or process. The personal image of anima is necessary for performing certain functions and constellating certain contents. Without the personal image (e.g., Michael Maier's *imaginatio*)<sup>e</sup> we would not be led (seduced) or interested (tempted); we would not experience certain qualities (the bitterness of salt, a personified substance); we could not experience the endogamous libido (incest with the soror); we would not find the delight and delusion in the dissolving, coloring, and whitening.

Consequently, the "depersonalizing" of anima (CW 13, §62) may mean depriving the anima of her *personalistic effects* and projec-



tions, but *not* of her appearance to the interior sense as a *personified numen*.<sup>a</sup> The “‘internalization through sacrifice’” (CW 16, §438), which seems Jung’s method for working through the “Meisterstück”<sup>b</sup> of anima integration does not require dissolving her as a personified figure.

Internalization through sacrifice – the principal concern of chapters VII and VIII of *Symbols of Transformation* (CW 5) and of Jung’s theory of transference (CW 16), in fact, the latent program throughout the process of individuation (CW 12 and 14) – takes on a far subtler meaning. This internalization and this sacrifice cannot be conceived as suppression of the extraverted soul or as sublimation (raising something lower to a more noble condition). It is not an immolation but a consecration. Sacrifice takes on its original sense of returning some event in the human world to the Gods, thereby raising the *value* (not the substance) of that event; and where internalizing means working into the interior of that event so that its value, and thus its sacredness, appears to insight. And, curiously, what appears during this sacrificial procedure called “internalization” and what enables insight to happen at all is the personified voice or figure of an anima.

The crucial support for my understanding of anima integration to mean *recognition of the anima as personified numen* comes from Jung himself:

There are no conclusive arguments against the hypothesis that these archetypal figures are endowed with personality at the outset and are not just secondary personalizations. In so far as the archetypes do not represent mere functional relationships, they manifest themselves as *daimones*, as personal agencies. In this form they are felt as actual experiences and are not “figments of the imagination,” as rationalism would have us believe. (CW 5, §388) . . . instead of deriving these figures from our psychic conditions, [we] must derive our psychic conditions from these figures. (CW 13, §299) It is not we who personify them; they have a personal nature from the very beginning. (ibid., §62) [It] . . . is quite right to treat the anima as an autonomous personality. . . (CW 7, §322; cf. §§317–27)

This personal nature is experienced in and through personified images. To leave these behind leaves the archetype itself, since ar-

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CW 13, §223

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Letter to Traugott Egloff

chetypes are personified a priori, "at the outset." Therefore, "internalization through sacrifice" must mean something other than "depersonalizing." Does it mean moving the anima image from outer person to inner person, i.e., withdrawing the projections from a human being?

Here we take an excursion to consider those wrangles in therapy about anima projections in love relationships. Sometimes one feels in Jung a *horror animae*, as when he says "marriage with the anima" is "possible only in the complete absence of psychological self-knowledge" (CW 16, §433). Here I believe it is the literalization against which he warns and not the actuality of anima lived in life. It is yet to be established that we find a truer and more authentic relationship with soul by dispensing with its living carrier in concrete existence. To break off a complex-ridden relationship charged with anima projections would be to literalize her into the person carrying the projections. Every prescription or proscription concerning what to do or how to behave literalizes. This is as true for actions in the "inner" world as for the "outer." Internalizing can become just as literal as acting out.

Whenever internalization through sacrifice means putting the knife to concrete life because it is concrete – e.g., renouncing "marriage with the anima," or sexuality, or tangible fascinations for the sake of the self's individuation process – then there has been no internalization whatsoever, merely a more radical literalization. Instead of internalization through sacrifice, there is literalization through suppression. Then, sacrifice itself has been literalized as denying, cutting, or killing concrete life, and internalization has been placed literally "inside" one's head or skin. (This primitive or Philistine<sup>40</sup> notion of internality was reviewed in chapter five above.) Likewise externality is not 'out there' in the concrete, extraverted world. It refers to the evident, obvious, *prima facie*, or superficial aspect of all events ("inner" or "outer"). We fall into externality all the time, even when internalizing in active imagination, taking the figures at face value, listening to their counsel literally, or simply by having to do active imagination at all in order to find depth, interiority, fantasy, and anima. Then the world of psychic images and the anima figure within this world hold magic sway. One is in thrall to Mistress Soul. No matter how introvertedly performed, this is externality, acting in, literalism, absolutiz-

ing, or whatever else one likes to call it. Jung gives an example of it in Spitteler's Prometheus.<sup>a</sup>

This obtuse sort of literalism also affects the notion of the hermaphrodite, as if it were simply a matter of joining the characteristics of two genders in one person. A man attempts to become more feminine, feeling and 'eros-connected' with the aim of integrating the anima – a notion of anima which we have already tried to dispel in earlier chapters. All the while that he is performing this *imitatio animae*, he is actually becoming more literal than imaginal and metaphorical which is what anima consciousness more likely implies. As Jung shows all through the *Mysterium Coniunctionis* (CW 14) and elsewhere, "male" and "female" are biological metaphors for the psychic conditions of conscious and unconscious.<sup>b</sup> Anima integration in the model of the hermaphrodite does not mean acquiring characteristics of the other gender; rather, it means a double consciousness, mercurial, true and untrue, action and inaction, sight and blindness, living the impossible oxymoron, more like an animal who is at once superbly conscious in its actions and utterly unconscious of them. To take the freakish image of the hermaphrodite and literalize it into sexual genders and then moralize it into a bi-sexual goal for behavior is a move as mistaken as considering the phallus to be the biological penis or the great mother to be one's own mother of one's childhood. The battle over literalism is never won; it simply reappears in new guises – thereby forcing us to be psychological.

It is not persons that we sacrifice but the personal. Now the several questions of this chapter come to one issue. Internalizing through sacrifice has nothing to do with choices between outer and inner. Such is literalism. Nor has it anything to do with depersonalizing in either form: changing personifications into functions and contents or transmigrations of soul from outer persons to inner images.

Depersonalizing the anima means what it says: *seeing through the personal aspects* of all personifications. It refers to that recognition that all the personal me-ness and self-important subjectivity derive from an archetype that is quite impersonal. Precisely this

is soul, that is, to the function of Prometheus conceding her an guide. . . . He sacrifices his on with the unconscious as ings. . . . Prometheus loses ld, and hence also the very reality. CW 6, §278

primordial image of the n psychology in the guise rds as *male* consciousness. . . .

t entirely in the field of irectly biological phenomena. The symbolic meaning of the ral philosophy turned it ents meant the gradual psychological process n of conscious and un- CW 9, i, §§296-97



connection between the personal and the archetype of the personal both depersonalizes and is sacrifice. For sacrifice, as we all know and always forget, means just this sort of connecting personal human events with their impersonal divine background. It means seeing the anima archetype in what's personally going on – and wherever it's going on, both with outer anima persons and inner anima images. The personal aspects of inner images, too, need seeing through as relatively autonomous archetypal events. They are impersonal and not concerned with “me” on the level of my subjective importance. Conversations with the inner anima image and her actions in dreams can make “me” anima-ridden just as any involvement with outer anima persons.

By returning the infusions, the beauty, the wiles, and vanities to their origins in the Goddesses, giving it all back to its background, we depersonalize the entire compulsive, autonomous performance. Then we can acknowledge that definition: “The anima is nothing but a representation of the personal nature of the autonomous system in question” (CW 13, §61).

Integrating the anima, which means becoming an integer or one with her, could only take place by our remembrance that we are already in her. Human being is being-in-soul (*esse in anima*) from the beginning. Integration is thus a shift of viewpoint from her in me to me in her. “Man is in *the* psyche (not in *his* psyche),”<sup>a</sup> which we also discussed in chapter five above. This recognition of where we actually and ontologically are is a sacrifice of our habitual consciousness, internalizing it within the embrace of the wider notion of psyche. This too is an “internalization through sacrifice” which can be spoken of more accurately as “relativizing the ego” (above, pp. 91–93) than as “integrating the anima.”

